Monday 30 March 2015

Qunut Prayer


"اللَّهُمَّ اهْدِنِي فِيمَنْ هَدَيْتَ، وَعَافِنِي فِيمَنْ عَافَيْتَ، وَتَوَلَّنِي فِيمَنْ تَوَلَّيْتَ، وَبَارِكْ لِي فِيمَا أَعطَيْتَ، وَقِنِي شَرَّ مَا قَضَيْتَ، فَإِنَّكَ تَقْضِي وَلَا يُقْضَى عَلَيْكَ، إِنَّهُ لَا يَذِلُّ مَنْ وَالَيْتَ، [وَلَا يَعِزُّ مَنْ عَادَيْتَ]، تَبَارَكْتَ رَبَّنَا وَتَعَالَيْتَ".
Allaahum-mahdinee feeman hadayta, wa 'aafinee feeman 'aafayta, wa tawallanee feeman tawallayta, wa baarik lee feemaa 'a'atayta, wa qinee sharra maa qadhayta, fa'innaka taqdhee wa laa yuqdhaa 'alayka, 'innahu laa yathillu man waalayta, [wa laa ya 'izzu man 'aadayta] , tabaarakta Rabbanaa wa ta'aalayta.

O Allah , guide me with those whom You have guided , and strengthen me with those whom You have given strength. Take me to Your care with those whom You have taken to Your care. Bless me in what You have given me. Protect me from the evil You have ordained. Surely, You command and are not commanded, and none whom You have committed to Your care shall be humiliated [and none whom You have taken as an enemy shall taste glory] . You are Blessed , Our Lord , and Exalted.

Reference:
Abu Dawud, Ibn Majah, An-Nasa'i, At-Tirmithi, Ahmad, Ad-Darimi, Al-Hakim, and Al-Bayhaqi. See also Al-Albani, Sahih At-Tirmithi 1/144, Sahih Ibn Majah 1/194, and 'Irwa'ul-GhaW. 2/ 172.

"اللَّهُمَّ إِنِّي أَعُوذُ بِرِضَاكَ مِنْ سَخَطِكَ، وَبِمُعَافَاتِكَ مِنْ عُقُوبَتِكَ، وأَعُوذُ بِكَ مِنْكَ، لَا أُحْصِي ثَنَاءً عَلَيْكَ، أَنْتَ كَمَا أَثْنَيْتَ عَلَى نَفْسِكَ".
Allaahumma 'innee 'a'oothu biridhaaka min sakhatika, wa bimu'aafaatika min 'uqoobatika, wa 'a'oothu bika minka, laa 'uhsee thanaa'an 'alayka, 'Anta kamaa 'athnayta 'alaa nafsika.


O Allah , I seek refuge with Your Pleasure from Your anger . I seek refuge in Your forgiveness from Your punishment . I seek refuge in You from You . I cannot count Your praises , You are as You have praised Yourself.


Reference:
Abu Dawud, Ibn Majah, An-Nasa'i, At-Tirmithi, Ahmad. See Al-Albani, Sahih At-Tirmithi 3/180, Sahih Ibn Majah 1/194, and 'Irwa'ul-Ghalil. 2/ 175.

"اللَّهُمَّ إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ، وَلَكَ نُصَلِّي وَنَسْجُدُ، وَإِلَيْكَ نَسْعَى وَنَحْفِدُ، نَرْجُو رَحْمَتَكَ، وَنَخْشَى عَذَابَكَ، إِنَّ عَذَابَكَ بِالْكَافِرِينَ مُلْحَقٌ. اللَّهُمَّ إِنَّا نَسْتَعِينُكَ، وَنَسْتَغْفِرُكَ، وَنُثْنِي عَلَيْكَ الْخَيْرَ، وَلَا نَكْفُرُكَ، وَنُؤْمِنُ بِكَ وَنَخْضَعُ لَكَ، وَنَخْلَعُ مَنْ يَكْفُرُكَ".
Allaahumma 'iyyaaka na'budu, wa laka nusallee wa nasjudu, wa 'ilayka nas'aa wa nahfidu, narjoo rahmataka, wa nakhshaa 'athaabaka, 'inna 'athaabaka bilkaafireena mulhaq. Allaahumma 'innaa nasta'eenuka, wa nastaghfiruka, wa nuthnee 'alaykal-khayr, wa laa nakfuruka, wa nu'minu bika, wa nakhdha'u laka, wa nakhla'u man yakfuruka.

O Allah, You alone do we worship and to You we pray and bow down prostrate. To You we hasten to worship and to serve. Our hope is for Your mercy and we fear Your punishment. Surely, Your punishment of the disbelievers is at hand. O Allah, we seek Your help and Your forgiveness, and we praise You beneficently. We do not deny You and we believe in You. We surrender to You and renounce whoever disbelieves in You.

Reference:
Al-Bayhaqi graded its chain authentic in As-Sunan Al-Kubra. Al-Albani said in 'Irwa'ul-GhaliL 2/170 that its chain is authentic as a statement of 'Umar.

Tuesday 24 March 2015

Alhambra Granada

In 711, Islam made its entrance into the Iberian Peninsula. Having been invited to end the tyrannical rule of King Roderick, Muslim armies under the leadership of Tariq ibn Ziyad crossed the straits between Morocco and Spain. Within seven years, most of the Iberian Peninsula (modern Spain and Portugal) was under Muslim control. Parts of this land would remain Muslim for over 700 years.
By the mid 900s, Islam had reached its zenith in the land known as al-Andalus. Over 5 million Muslims lived there, making up over 80% of the population. A strong, united Umayyad caliphate ruled the land and was by far the most advanced and stable society in Europe. The capital, Cordoba, attracted those seeking education from all over the Muslim world and Europe. However, this golden age of politics and society would not last forever. In the 1000s, the caliphate broke up and divided into numerous small states called taifas. The Muslim taifas were disunited and susceptible to invasion from Christian kingdoms in the north. For the next 200 years, the taifas fell one by one to the Christian “Reconquista”. By the 1240s, one kingdom remained in the south: Granada. This article will analyze the fall of this final Muslim kingdom in Iberia.

Emirate of Granada

The seal of the Emirate of Granada, declaring "There is no victor except for Allah"
The seal of the Emirate of Granada, declaring “There is no victor except for Allah”
During the Reconquista, Muslim states fell one by one to Christian kingdoms invading from the North. The major cities of Cordoba, Seville, and Toledo fell from the 1000s to the 1200s. The Murabitun and Muwwahidun (Almoravid and Almohad) movements from North Africa helped slow the Christian tide, but disunity among the Muslims eventually led to continued loss of land.
One Muslim state – Granada – was able to escape conquest by Christians in the 1200s. After the fall of Cordoba in 1236, the rulers of the Emirate of Granada signed a special agreement with the Kingdom of Castile, one of the most powerful Christian kingdoms. Granada had agreed to become a tributary state to Castile. This meant they were allowed to remain independent as the Emirate of Granada, but in exchange for not being invaded by Castile, they had to pay a yearly sum (usually in gold) to the Castilian monarchy. This created a detrimental situation for the Muslims of Granada as they paid regularly to strengthen their enemies.
Despite this, one of the reasons Granada was able to maintain its independence was its geography. It lies high in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of Southern Spain. The mountains created a natural barrier for any invading armies. Thus, despite being militarily weaker than Castile, the mountainous terrain provided a huge defensive advantage.

The Granada War

For over 250 years, Granada remained as a tributary state to the stronger Kingdom of Castile. But surrounded by unfriendly Christian nations, Granada was constantly at risk of being exterminated. In the early 1400s, a Muslim scholar wrote of al-Andalus’ last kingdom, “Is Granada not enclosed between a violent sea and an enemy terrible in arms, both of which press on its people day and night?”
The impetus for the conquest of Granada occurred in 1469, when King Ferdinand of Aragon of Queen Isabella of Castile married. This united the two most powerful Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula. With a united front, now the Christians set their sights on removing the last Muslim state from the peninsula.
King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella sought to destroy the last Muslim emirate of al-Andalus
King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella sought to destroy the last Muslim emirate of al-Andalus
In 1482, war began between the new Kingdom of Spain and the Emirate of Granada. Despite being in a much weaker position, the Granadans fought valiantly. One Spanish chronicler expressed his respect for the Muslim soldiers, “the Moors [Muslims] put all their strength and all their heart into the combat, as a courageous man is bound to do when defending his life, his wife, and his children.” The ordinary Muslim civilians and soldiers were fighting for their existence and the survival of Islam in al-Andalus, and fought very bravely. The Muslim rulers, on the other hand, were not as chivalrous or brave.
Throughout the war, the Christians remained unified and did not break up into separate warring factions, as they had commonly in the past. In contrast, Granada experienced huge political upheaval. Muslim leaders and governors were commonly at odds and scheming different plans to undermine each other. Many of them were even secretly working with the Christian kingdoms in exchange for wealth, land, and power. Worse than all of that, in 1483, one year into the war, the sultan’s son, Muhammad, rebelled against his father and sparked a civil war in Granada, just as Spanish forces began to attack from outside.
King Ferdinand planned to use the civil war to his advantage. He supported Muhammad in his fight against his father (and later, his uncle) in an effort to weaken Granada as a whole. Muhammad was supported with arms and soldiers by Ferdinand in the fight against other members of his family, and thus was able to take power over Granada. Throughout this armed struggle, Christian armies slowly pressed further into Granadian lands, so that by the time Muhammad took power in 1490, he only ruled the city of Granada and nothing of the surrounding countryside.

Granada’s Last Stand

Right after solidifying his rule over Granada, however, Muhammad was sent a letter by King Ferdinand that demanded he immediately surrender the city. Muhammad was very surprised by this demand as Ferdinand had given him the impression that he would be allowed to rule over Granada with Ferdinand’s support. Clearly, Muhammad realized too late that he had been just a pawn used by Ferdinand to weaken Granada.
Muhammad decided to resist the Christians militarily and sought help from other Muslim kingdoms throughout North Africa and the Middle East. No help came besides a small Ottoman navy that raided the Spanish coast and did not cause much damage. By the end of 1491, the city of Granada was surrounded by Ferdinand and Isabella’s army. From the towers of his palace, Alhambra, Muhammad could see the huge Christian armies assembling and preparing to conquer the city. With this depressing future in sight, Muhammad was forced to sign a treaty which gave over control of the city in November 1491.
Christian banners and crosses were hung from the Alhambra on January 2nd, 1492
Christian banners and crosses were hung from the Alhambra on January 2nd, 1492
On January 2nd, 1492, the treaty took effect and the Spanish army entered Granada and officially took possession of the last Muslim state of al-Andalus. Christian soldiers occupied the legendary Alhambra palace that morning. They hung the banners and flags of Spain’s Christian monarchs from the walls, signifying their victory. At the top of Alhambra’s tallest tower, they erected a giant silver cross, telling the terrified people of Granada below that the forces of Christendom had been victorious over the Muslims of al-Andalus. Muslims were too fearful to venture outdoors, and the streets were deserted.
Sultan Muhammad was exiled, and on his way out of Granada, he stopped at a mountain pass to look back at Granada and began to cry. His mother was unimpressed with his sudden remorse and scolded him, “Do not cry like a woman for that which you could not defend as a man.”
Although the victorious Christians promised religious freedom and generally favorable terms to the people of Granada, these promises were soon broken. In 1502, Islam was officially outlawed in Granada and hundreds of thousands of Muslims had to either immigrate to North Africa or hide their beliefs. By the early 1600s, not a single Muslim was left in all of Spain.
The story of al-Andalus’ decline from one of the Muslim world’s leading political and social powers in the 1000s to a rump state that was conquered in the late 1400s is one that has no match in Islamic history.  The constant infighting among Muslims, the lack of support from other Muslim empires, and the focus on personal power instead of Islamic unity all led to this downfall. And with the loss of Granada in 1492, that story ended.

Monday 23 March 2015

Islam Says About Terrorism

Unfortunately more and more often, Islam has been associated with terrorism and violence due to the actions of a few extreme individuals who’ve taken it upon themselves to do the most heinous crimes in the name of Islam.

Tragic events such as the attack on the twin towers in New York, the bombings of Bali, Madrid and London are assumed to be justified by Islam in the minds of some people. This idea has been fueled further by many media channels which defame Islam by portraying these bombers as ‘Islamists’ or ‘Jihadists’, as though they were sanctioned by Islam, or had any legitimate spokemenship on behalf of Muslims. The actions of a few fanatical individuals who happen to have Muslim names or ascribe themselves to the Muslim faith should not be a yardstick by which Islam is judged. For the same reason, that one would not do justice to Christianity if it where perceived as sanctioning the genocide of the Native Americans, the atrocities of world war II or the bombings of the IRA.

To understand Islam’s stance on terrorism, one must refer to its original sources, the Quran and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him,which are explicit in their prohibition of any form of injustice including that of wanton violence which seeks to instill fear, injury or death to civilians.

The Quran turns our attention to the high value of human life, whether it is Muslim or Non-Muslim and makes it absolutely forbidden to take an innocent life unjustly. The gravity of such a crime is equated, in the Quran, with the killing of all humanity.

“On that account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if any one slew a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people. Then although there came to them Our apostles with clear signs, yet, even after that, many of them continued to commit excesses in the land.” ( 5:32 )

Not only is human life sacred in Islam but the property, wealth, family and dignity of all individuals in society are to be respected and protected. Those who transgress these rights and sow fasad (corruption) as the Quran describes it, incur the wrath of Allah.

"…and seek not corruption in the earth; lo! Allah loveth not corrupters " (28:77)

Likewise in another verse

“The blame is only against those who oppress men and wrong-doing and insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land, defying right and justice: for such there will be a penalty grievous” (42:42)

Islam goes further than just prohibiting oppression and safeguarding rights, it commands its faithful to deal kindly and compassionately to all those who seek to live in peace and harmony

"Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for your faith, nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: For Allah loves those who are just" (60:8)


In times of war and conflict, where enmity can obstruct an individual’s judgement to act morally, Islam commands that justice be upheld even towards one’s enemies.

"O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do" (5:8)

Centuries before the Geneva Convention was drawn up, Muslims were bound by a code of conduct which the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, set. He forbade the killing of women, children and elderly in war. In an authentic narration the Prophet (pbuh) warned that he who kills anyone who has a covenant of peace with the Muslims will not smell the scent of Paradise. In fact, he taught that justice is not only to humans but must be shown to animals and all living things. In a narration the Prophet (pbuh) informed us about how a lady was sent to hell because of a cat she had locked up until it starved and died. If such is the sanctity which Islam places on the soul of an animal, how much more grave is the killing of hundreds of innocent humans?!

Abu Bakr the first Calipha of the Muslims reflected these prophetic teachings when he advised his general Yazid, who was confronting Roman armies,

"I advise you ten things, Do not kill women or children or an aged, infirm person. Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees. Do not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food. Do not burn bees and do not scatter them. Do not steal from the booty, and do not be cowardly."

The message of the Quran is clear as we have seen, that the sanctity of any human life is to be respected and any violation in that regard is paramount to the worst crime. Mercy is at the heart of the Islamic call, “We sent thee (O Muhammad) not save as a mercy for the peoples” (21:107); a totally different message to what the terrorists are sadly imparting to humanity.
 


Friday 20 March 2015

Indonesia as a Model of Muslim Democracy Developments, Problems, and Opportunities

Luthfi Assyaukanie
is Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at Paramadina University and a Research Fellow at the Freedom Institute; both are based in Jakarta. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Melbourne, Australia. He has been engaged in the civil society movement, advocating freedom and human rights issues. His latest book is Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Iseas 2009). 


In the wake of Islamic resurgence and the growing democratic movements in North Africa and the Middle East, it is relevant to see Indonesia as a model of Muslim democracy. The country has shown a stable democratic government, civil liberties, and tremendous economic growth.

Prior to 1998, Turkey was often considered a model of Muslim democracy. Not only was it the sole majority Muslim country that rigorously applied secular principles, it also tried to maintain a democratic government. Although there were some criticisms against military dominance in Turkish politics, many people at the time still considered Turkey to be the only democratic Muslim country in the world. In the absence of a democratic government in the Muslim world, the presence of Turkish democracy, however minimal it was, was a relief.
 
This view began to change when Indonesia moved from an authoritarian regime to democracy in 1998. Eight years later the country was crowned by US based think tank, Freedom House, as a free country: the only large Muslim majority country to have attained such a status. Among countries in North Africa and the Middle East, Israel is the only country to be regarded as free.

Since then, many world leaders lauded the rise of democracy in Indonesia. US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, called Indonesia a role model of democracy for the Muslim world. She believed that "Indonesia's own recent history provides an example for a transition to civilian rule and building strong democratic institutions". Likewise, President Obama pointed out that Indonesia’s democracy can be Egypt’s model. Indeed, Obama has often praised Indonesian democracy as a good example for the world. In the wake of democratic movements spreading through large parts of the Arab world, it is necessary to explore Muslim models of democracy. There are at least four reasons why Indonesia is a good model.
Four reasons
First, Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world that has undergone political transition from authoritarian regime to democracy.

Second, the country has maintained political stability despite the ethnic conflicts and religious riots in the first years of its political transition.

Third, Indonesia has demonstrated stable economic performance. Over the last five years, economic growth in Indonesia has been around 6%. During the global financial crisis in 2009, together with China and India, Indonesia was the only country that could maintain economic growth above 4%.

Fourth, Indonesia is the only Muslim majority country where Islamic political parties have failed to win the general election. In North African and the Middle Eastern countries, democracy always gives Islamic political parties victory.

Indonesia is an interesting case for anyone to study the interplay between Islam and democracy. In the wake of Islamic resurgence and the growing democratic movements in North Africa and the Middle East, the question whether Muslim countries are going to be more Islamized or secularized becomes increasingly important. Let me explain first the historical background of Indonesia’s road to democracy.

The current process of democratization in Indonesia started in 1998, particularly on 21 May, when President Soeharto publicly announced his resignation from his 32 year rule of the country. The announcement was quite surprising as he was just elected for the seventh time and had committed to rule the country for another five years. The public pressure from students seemed to be Suharto’s main reason for resignation. Student movements had occupied the parliament for three days and riots a week earlier (14-15 May) had brought the capital city to a standstill. Indonesia was on the brink of financial and political collapse. Soeharto’s resignation was the right response in a dire situation .
The struggle for democracy
Like in many other countries, political transition is never easy, particularly with a country that has been ruled by an authoritarian-military regime. Soeharto handed down his government to Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie, his deputy, but he was perceived as a part of the same regime. Worsened by economic crisis, Indonesian politics in the first three years of its transition was filled by tension, conflict, and demonstrations.

People felt free to express what they think. Democracy allowed them to form organizations where they could recruit and mobilize people. Hundreds of organizations and political parties were formed. Groups with various ideological inclinations filled the public sphere bringing their own paradoxes. Indonesian democracy in its early years was chaotic and people started to speak about the disentegration of the Republic and the potential for Balkanization.

People were dissatisfied with the new government and they perceived it as a 
sequel to the old one. The economic crisis brought the country to its most difficult times in three decades. Inflation reached 77%, interest rates jumped to 68%, gross domestic product went down to minus 13%, and unemployment rose to 24%. From the beginning, Habibie’s power was always considered to be short term.

People wanted a fair general election where they could choose their own leaders. Various laws regarding the political transition were drafted and enacted. The general election was scheduled for June 1999. It was a parliamentary election where people voted for legislative members. According to the constitution then, the president was not directly selected by the people but by the legislative members.

The 1999 general election was not only about the selection of a new leader and the hope for a better economic future, but Indonesian democracy and the trajectory of the country was also at stake. Soon after the general election was scheduled, hundreds of political parties were formed and registered themselves to the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU).

Islamic political parties were among them. Out of 160 parties that enrolled in the KPU, only 48 parties met the the basic conditions and were entitled to join the election. Among these parties, 11 were Islamic parties whose mission was to struggle for the implementation of Sharia (Islamic Law) in the country. All parties were so optimistic that their leaders confidently predicted that they would win the election.

Before the result of the election was announced no one knew what was going to happen with Indonesian democracy. Some people were cautious about the rise of political Islam and the possibility of Islamists winning the election. The agenda of Islamic political parties was quite clear: returning the “seven words” back to the constitution. The seven words are the wording that contains the implementation ofSharia for Muslims in Indonesia.

The words were originally in the constitution, but following the protests by a Christian delegation, on 18 August 1945, the Preparatory Committee of Independence removed them. Throughout recent Indonesian history, Muslims have been struggling to return the words back to the constitution. They tried during the Soekarno times, but failed. They had also tried in the Soeharto times, but it was just impossible to do so as the regime did not allow any talk about political Islam. The opportunity had just come when Indonesia became a democratic country. They put their hope in the 1999 general election.

Eventually, the general election result defied many expectations. The winner was the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP), a secular party led by the daughter of Soekarno, the first president of the Republic. In second place was Golkar, another secular party, the ruling party throughout the Soeharto era. Out of 11 Islamic parties, only one party gained significant votes, namely Development and Unity Party (PPP) that obtained 10.7%. The rest only obtained less than 3%. The whole votes of Islamic parties combined were no more than 20%, not enough to dominate the parliament.

This result disappointed many Muslim leaders who wished for victory. Something that has been happening recently in the Middle East did not happen in Indonesia. Democracy does not side with Islamic parties to win the race for political power.

The question we should address here is, why did the majority of Indonesian Muslims not vote for Islamic parties, but rather to secular (or non-religious) parties? Has not there been an Islamization process in the country? Why is the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia is not followed by the success in gaining political power?

There are many answers to these questions. But, the most striking one is that there has been a radical change in the political mindset of Indonesian Muslims. Partly due to the external factors that were boosted by secular-militaristic regime under Soeharto and partly due to internal ones which were pushed by liberal Muslims. These two factors played a crucial role in changing Muslims’ political mindset and the way Muslims perceived democracy. Let me elaborate more on this aspect.
Islam and democracy
Along with nationalism and communism, democracy is one of the most debated concepts among Indonesian Muslims. During 1930s, there was a debate on nationalism between two young intellectuals who then became important leaders of the country: Soekarno (1901-70) and Muhammad Natsir (1908-93). Representing the secular group, Soekarno believed that nationalism is the glue for Indonesian unity. Meanwhile, speaking on behalf Islamic group, Natsir considered nationalism as an ideology that could dilute Muslims’ religious belief. The debate between Soekarno and Natsir was the classic example of the disagreement between secularists and Islamists over various issues regarding religion and politics.

The Islamists were generally reluctant to embrace modern concepts such as nationalism, socialism, and democracy. While their counterpart, the secularists, unhesitatingly promoted those modern ideas, the Islamists criticized and often condemned them on the basis of Islamic arguments. Their objection to these concepts was mostly based on their particular understanding of Islamic doctrines that they believed to be superior to secular ideas.

Natsir, for example, prefered to embrace an Islamic version of democracy: that is, a combination between Western democracy and the Islamic model known as “Shura.” Natsir’s reluctance to accept democracy was due to his understanding that democracy could harm Islamic principles. He believed that there are certain things in Islam that are considered to be final (qat’i), thus giving no room for people to discuss them. He gave the examples of gambling and pornography as being beyond discussion. Parliament has no right to discuss such things.

During the early time of independence (mid 1940s), Muslim leaders found themselves to be more comfortable to embrace the concept of “Islamic democracy” than just “democracy.” Theoretically, the concept was widely promoted by Muslim intellectuals and scholars. Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911-83), another proponent of Islamic democracy, argued that Islamic political system is not a theocracy as some people might think, but rather democracy.

The roots of Islamic democracy, according to Ahmad, are the Qur’an and the political life in early generation of Islam under “the rightly guided caliphs” (al-khulafa al-rashidun). In the verses 159 of the Sura Ali Imran and 59 of al-Nisa, the Qur’an clearly advises Muslims to maintain the deliberative method approved in the decision making process. For Ahmad, this is a strong argument for Muslims to embrace democracy. Likewise, Ahmad believes that “the early caliphate system was democratic, since it had sufficiently maintained democratic requirements. Democratic instruments such as a people’s assembly, succession, deliberation, and social institutions, had all existed during that time”.

Muslim leaders like Natsir and Ahmad believed in democracy not only because it 
was theologically justifiable, but also because they believed that with democracy they could win the race to political power. As Muslims are the biggest population in the country, there is a possibility to win the democratic contest. It is for this reason that they formed an Islamic party and then joined the general election in 1955.

The early generation of Indonesian Muslims generally understood democracy as majority rule and mostly ignored its substance. They belived, that as Muslims are the majority, they could rule the country according to their taste, ignoring the rights of minorities. They enthusiastically accepted democracy because it could help them to gain political power through general elections. If they won the election, they could dominate the parliament and thus change the constitution. This was the main reason why Islamic political parties were so ready to participate in the election.

Indonesian history would have been different had the Islamic parties won the 1955 general election. In that election, all Islamic parties obtained 43%; enough to take over the government, but not enough to steer the parliament. The Law requires two third of the parliamant members as a minimal requirement for changing the constitution. Certainly, Muslims leaders were disappointed by the result, but they fully realized the consequence of democracy.

With this failure, they accepted the rules of the game: enjoying their position according to what they got in the election. Thus, Muslim representatives were in the parliament and some of their leaders were involved in the government. Burhanuddin Harahap (1917-1987), a Masyumi leader, was appointed prime minister from August 1955 to March 1956. As a chairman, he had to deal with other people and had to participate lawfully. He fully realized that he could not impose his party’s vision of Islamic democracy.
The role of liberal Muslims
What is good from democracy is that it teaches people patience and tolerance. If one loses an election, one has to wait for four or five more years to put another bet. And if one slightly won the election, he or she has to deal with other winners. One has to share the “electoral cake” with others to form a government. Indonesian Muslims had learnt so much about politics and how to deal with it.

Many things happened during Soeharto’s New Order regime. Muslims were barred from forming Islamic parties. They were forced to join one of the three parties approved by the regime, namely Golkar,Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and Development and Unity Party(PPP). Some scholars argue that the change of Muslim political mindset was greatly due to the way Soeharto treated them. Indonesian Muslims have been politically secularized that their attitude towards politics has no longer been the same (Effendy 2003; Hefner 2000; Anwar 1995).

It is true that Soeharto’s New Order regime had played a crucial role in changing Muslim political attitudes. The shift, however, is not only due to Soeharto who ruled the country repressively, but also due to the long and passionate role played by Muslim intellectuals. What is happening in Indonesia is not happening in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. Indonesian intellectuals played an important role in changing Muslim political mindset and attitude.

Through lectures, writings, and actions, they advocated democracy and delegitimized Islamic parties. Unlike in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, the Indonesian reform movement has always been through organizations. Intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009), Ahmad Syafii Maarif (born 1935) and Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) are Muslim leaders who chaired big organizations. They spread their liberal ideas to Muslim society through these organizations. Wahid did it through Nahdlatul Ulama (40 million members), Maarif through Muhammadiyah (30 million members), and Madjid through Islamic Student Association and its alumnae (over 10 million members).
In Egypt, the Islamic reform movement has developed in a more solitary manner. Great intellectuals such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1837-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) did not have any organization where they could spread their ideas. This trend continues until today’s generation of reformers. Intellectuals such as Hassan Hanafi (born 1935) and Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd (1943-2010) are solitary thinkers who do not have big followers. They disseminated their ideas in academic classes, seminars, and scholarly journals. No matter how sophisticated their ideas are, they remain limited and never reached to the grass roots.
Promotion through organisations
In Indonesia, Muslim intellectuals have been very active in promoting democracy and pluralism to Muslim societies. Abdurrahman Wahid was one of the most influential leaders among the Nahdlatul Ulama members. Born in a strong family background and educated in Baghdad and Cairo, Wahid was highly respected by both Muslims and non-Muslims in the country. He read Western literatures and tried to synthesize them with Islamic intellectual tradition.

One of Wahid’s most significant contributions to Indonesia is his untiring campaign for democracy and Pancasila (five principles) as the only basis of the state. Since independence until 1980s, many Muslims believed that adopting Pancasila – not Islam – could dilute their Islamic creed. Wahid argued that Pancasila did not contradict Islam. Throughout his career as an intellectual, Wahid publicly criticized and delegitimized Islamic political parties. He denounced the idea of Islamic state and refused the formal implementation ofSharia.

Nurcholish Madjid was another intellectual who is remembered for his daring ideas that challenge Muslim minds. Since early 1970s, he consistently campaigned for secularization and appealed Muslims to separate their religious interests from politics. Like Wahid, Madjid also campaigned against the idea of Islamic state and Islamic party. For him, Muslims could channel their political aspirations in non-religious (secular) parties. He believed that what is more important for Muslims is not to struggle for formalistic agenda of Islam such as the implementation of Sharia, but the substantial ones such as healthcare, security, and education.

During 1980s, there were quite a number of Muslim intellectuals coming from religious background but campaigned for liberal Islam, that is the Islam that supports liberal values such as freedom, democracy, pluralism, and tolerance. Most of them affiliated with major Islamic organization such as NU and Muhammadiyah. They played a crucial role in enlightening Indonesian Muslims. Through mass media, discussion forums, public lectures, and social actions, they spread their flexible interpretations of Islam and appealed Muslims to fully engage with modern challenges.
Conclusion
Indonesian democracy is still young but it is growing dynamically. Despite many problems that Indonesian government has to face, the country can successfully keep its economic growth, curbing the unemployment rate, reforming legal system, and building infrastructure. Since 1998, Indonesia has undergone three general elections, which were consecutively won by secular (non-religious) parties, namely Indonesian Democratic Party (1999), Golkar (2004), and Democratic Party (2009).

These three parties have a great commitment for democracy and Indonesian pluralism. On the other hand, Islamic political parties are declining. According to the recent survey released by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), Indonesian Muslims keep their preference to secular parties for the next general election (2014).

In spite of such an optimist view, there are two big challenges that Indonesian democracy is facing seriously: corruption and intolerance. Over the past ten years, the Indonesian government has been fighting against corruption. An independent institute called Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), was founded and is working hard to bring corruptors to justice. Hundreds of corruptors have been detained and hundreds more are in waiting.

Meanwhile, intolerant actions have threatened the unity of the country. Radical Islamic groups have been the biggest threat for pluralism and harmony in the country. Indonesian government have worked hard to curb the terrorist groups and approached the moderate Muslims to fight against Islamic radicalism. If the Indonesian people and government can overcome these two challenges, there is a very big possibility for the country to become a role model for Muslim democracy.

Islam and Democracy


The theme of Islam and democracy continues to receive a great deal of attention from policy makers, scholars, the media, and even the general population of many countries in the world. Democracy is an idea and a set of practices that emerged in ancient Athens millennia ago, vanished around 320 BCE, and only reappeared in Europe around the seventeenth century, principally in the works of writers such as John Locke (1632–1704). The essential idea, that the people (demos) are sovereign and therefore entitled to depose a tyrannical ruler, may even be traced to the works of certain medieval schoolmen, such as John of Salisbury (d. 1176), though these early treatments seem to justify such actions more on grounds of the ruler's religious impiety. Locke, and his fellow Englishman the poet John Milton (1608–1674), broadened the grounds for the removal of rulers to include general despotism and based their argument on doctrines of natural law and hence the natural rights of the people. In the eighteenth century, other social contract theorists, including Rousseau (1712–1778), Adam Ferguson (1723–1815), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), further elaborated on the points made by their illustrious predecessors.
While doctrines of democracy have become ever more sophisticated, democracy as a Western institution—despite its ancient Greek pedigree—is really not more than four centuries old. Accordingly, when Muslims are considered in the context of discussions about democracy, the fact that it is relatively new in the West is sometimes forgotten. It is worth noting that, at least since the French Revolution of 1789, democracy has been considered in terms not just of individual freedom and liberty, but also in terms of the equality of the people. A moment's reflection will suffice to understand that liberty may actually conflict with equality. Considerations of individual liberty demand that the state and its government not interfere in the ability of the citizen to optimize his or her opportunities in life. In contrast to this, equality may even mandate the state's interference to equalize opportunities or even redistribute wealth and other scarce resources, in the interests of achieving an egalitarian society. So, which model of democracy is more “authentic”?
The common Western understanding supposes that “Islam” is antithetical to democracy and even valorizes authoritarianism, regardless of how the concept of democracy and this set of values and practices is defined. The legacy of this approach reverts to the eighteenth century, when leaders of Muslim majority societies, such as the sultans of the Ottoman empire or the shahs of Iran, were depicted as exemplars of Oriental despotism. Although the roots of this term, ironically, appear to extend back to ancient Greece and its application by Aristotle to Alexander the Great (d. 330 BCE), its modern formulation can be found in Montesquieu's (1689–1755) The Spirit of the Laws, not to mention Marx and Engels's nineteenth-century utilizations of the concept to characterize the “mode of production” of “Asiatic political systems.”
In the modern era it has been the custom in certain quarters to maintain that Islamic political culture valorizes authoritarianism and rejects democratic values. Voltaire (1694–1778) greatly admired English political culture, advocating its values for monarchical France. Seen in that light, his polemical drama, Fanaticism, or Mahomet the Prophet (1742) was his way of attacking the “infamy”—as he saw it—and hypocrisy of the French first estate, the clergy. Fanaticism is obviously incompatible with democracy. Although Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) considered the Prophet of Islam a hero, the prevalent view seemed to be that he was the leader of a (false) religion that could only establish itself by means of physical force.
These seventeenth- to nineteenth-century views of Islam as a religion of coercion were the predecessors to the generalizations of the twentieth-century Harvard scholar, Samuel P. Huntington. Using anecdotal evidence, such as the flying of airplanes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan by radical Muslims in September 2001, scholars such as Huntington and others influenced by him have claimed vindication for the view that not only is “Islam” a violent religion but that “Islamic civilization” is on a determined course to “clash” with “Western civilization” in the name of authoritarian politics.1 Reifying “Islam,” rather than talking about Muslims, Huntington himself became a prophet of the view that “Islam” hates freedom and would take advantage of any opportunity provided it by democracy to establish itself in power and then proceed to dismantle any and all democratic institutions to prevent others from rising to power. There are many problems with the Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” thesis. Trenchant critiques have been made of its argument on both theoretical and empirical grounds.2 One of the theoretical problems of Huntington's argument is the idea that civilizations—which are his unit of analysis—can act. Similarly, one cannot speak of “Islam” as an actor, only of “Islams,” or, preferably, Muslims. An empirical shortcoming of his argument is the premise that religion, used to promote violent ends, is unique to Islamic societies; it is not, rather religion has been used to justify violence in non-Muslim areas of the world, such as Northern Ireland, India, Sri Lanka, and even the United States (consider the Oklahoma City terrorist attack). Additionally, many Muslim states and governments have pursued accommodationist, not conflictual, policies toward the West. Moreover, the broad generalization that “Islam” opposes democracy flies in the face of empirical evidence, such as that provided by Freedom House's World Values Surveys (1981–2001). Researchers found that when polled to express their views of democracy, Muslims gave responses that were virtually indistinguishable from answers given by those in the West. Norris and Inglehart maintain that “when political attitudes are compared (including evaluations of how well democracy works in practice, support for democratic ideals, and disapproval of strong leaders), far from a clash of values, there is minimal difference between the Muslim world and the West.” 3
It is true that important Muslim leaders have spoken derisively about democracy. Sometimes this contempt is directed at Westerners who emphasize the virtues of this model of politics but who tend to ignore derelictions. Egypt under British rule (1882–1952) experimented with parliamentary democracy; however, the British manipulated the Egyptian political system so that outcomes were frequently authoritarian, not democratic. Moreover, many of those elected to parliament during those years actually subverted its workings. Many members of parliament were large landowners who, through a combination of threats and bribes, gained the votes of the peasant farmers on their land. This gave the landowners free reign to do as they pleased, until the next election cycle. On other occasions, Muslim leaders have criticized democracy because embracing it seemed to be an implicit criticism of belief in Islamic truths. Hence, Ayatollah Khomeini often expressed unhappiness with the desire of those who advocated the creation of a democratic Islamic order, as though, as he saw it, there could be such a thing as a non-democratic Islamic order. Some Muslim spokespersons, moreover, have decried democracy as being a prelude to secularism and the separation of religion and politics; they believe the two cannot be separated. Finally, some Muslim leaders have denounced democracy because they fear the application of its principles would lead to their loss of power.
Furthermore, even if some—especially the latter—of these points are true, this point does not mean that Islam and democracy are incompatible. It merely means that some leaders want to rule without resort to transparency and accountability—two critical ingredients of democratic politics. It seems far more accurate to account for the lag of democracy in a number of Muslim-majority societies by referring not to scriptural texts that putatively discourage democratic values (since one can also refer to texts that apparently encourage such values), but rather to certain structural attributes of these societies. Among these must be included the enduring legacy of patrimonial forms of rule. Without arguing that historical patterns determine contemporary arrangements, it is worth pointing out that feudal models (which characterized most of the Western European experience) featured reciprocity of rights and obligations, whereas patrimonialism—the model applicable to non-European systems—entitled the ruler, at least in theory, full rights over all the resources of his patrimony.
If explanations by reference to sacred texts are inadequate, and the implementation of democratic values is historically contingent, then the development of democracy in Muslim-majority societies that currently are not characterized by democratic politics is certainly possible. But this begs the question of what one means by democracy. As noted earlier, democracy can be viewed, just as validly, by giving primacy to equality over individual liberty. If the democratic model in question is that which Macpherson once called the “political theory of possessive individualism,”4 few Muslims would accept it. This variant of liberalism treats the individual
as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and his capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by their exercise. Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.5
Because the teachings of the faith, if not necessarily the practice of rule by Muslim leaders, stress the importance of the interests of the community (ummah), few Muslims would accept this version of liberalism—which is the foundation for many understandings of democracy. However, social or communitarian democracy would appear to be compatible with Islamic teachings.
A final thought: Iranian presidential elections were held in June 2009. The overwhelming consensus is that the regime rigged these elections in favor of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was sworn in for his second term as president on 5 August 2009. Clearly this is a blatantly undemocratic maneuver for the purposes of holding on to power, but it should also be noted that the incumbent's rival, former Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi, was not necessarily democratic during the period he was in office (1981–1989). However, it is always possible for people to modify their views, and this may well be the case with him. If the elections themselves were an anti-democratic charade, the demonstrations that broke out in their aftermath, and have not been totally suppressed at the time of this writing, reveal the appeal of democracy to the broad masses of Iran. It is important to stress that these people apparently feel deeply that their belief in Islamic values is a major part of their motivations to protest what has happened. It is therefore critical not to attribute the authoritarian behavior of the officials in charge of the Khomeinist state to “Islam.” Islam is not an actor that acts, or constrains, or proposes. This is all about Muslims, whose differences in beliefs and actions are to be explained by their ideal and material interests. If we bear this in mind, then certainly this faith is compatible with democratic values.
1Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
2Among the most stimulating is Roy P. Mottahedeh, “Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist's Critique,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 1–26.
3Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 154.
4Crawford Brough Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
5Macpherson, p. 3.

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